动态成本特征下的散乱污染源治理演化博弈研究  

Study on Evolutionary Game of the Scattered Pollution Governance Based on Dynamic Inspection Costs

作　　者：温丹辉[1] 丁守宏 孙振清[1] WEN Danhui;DING Shouhong;SUN Zhenqing(College of Economic and Management,Tianjin University of Science and Technology,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津科技大学经济与管理学院,天津300222

出　　处：《生态经济》2022年第2期197-203,共7页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“优化开发区域率先实现碳排放峰值目标路径研究”(16AGL002);天津市科技计划项目“基于多区域CGE模型的京津冀协同创新发展路径研究”(18ZLZXZF00210);天津市高等学校创新团队培养计划(TD25005)。

摘　　要：散乱污染源治理是当前环境治理难点。论文建立了散乱污染源与监管机构之间的随机演化博弈模型,讨论了动态检查成本特征下的均衡位置及收敛性问题。计算结果表明,散乱污染源监管可能呈现完全失效、隐性失效和常规情形三种均衡状态,监管完全失效的主要原因是固定检查成本过高;隐形失效的主要原因是变动检查成本过高;常规情形中,较高检查成本会导致低治污水平,较低检查成本容易出现污染反弹问题。针对散乱污染源治理,提出以下政策建议:应积极推广监管新技术以降低检查成本;应提升违法处罚水平以降低监管所需要的均衡概率;坚持环保督察常态化以防止污染反弹。Scattered pollution control is a difficulty in China’s environmental regulation.A stochastic evolutionary game model between scattered polluters and regulators is established and evolutionary stable strategies and their convergences under dynamic inspection costs are discussed.The results show that there are three equilibrium states:the complete failure situation,the implicit failure situation and the conventional situation;the main reason for the complete failure of supervision is the high fixed inspection cost;the main reason of implicit failure is the high variable inspection cost.In the conventional situation,higher inspection cost leads to low pollution control level,and lower inspection cost is prone to pollution rebound.Main policy suggestions are:new technologies should be promoted to reduce inspection costs;illegal punishment should be raised to reduce the balanced probability required by supervision;regular environmental monitoring should be performed to prevent pollution rebound.

关 键 词：环境治理 散乱污染源 检查成本 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：X5[环境科学与工程—环境工程]