碳交易中企业减排行为的演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Study on Enterprise Emission Reduction Behavior in Carbon Trading

作　　者：张铁山[1] 梁旭 蒋贵凰[1] ZHANG Tieshan;LIANG Xu;JIANG Guihuang(Col.of Economics and Business Administration,North China Univ,of Tech.,100144,Beijing,China)

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济管理学院,北京100144

出　　处：《北方工业大学学报》2021年第5期75-82,共8页Journal of North China University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“区域知识战略定位方法研究:基于知识结构与知识能力评估”(71603005)。

摘　　要：基于系统动力学理论,构建政府与企业碳减排演化博弈模型,通过数值仿真剖析了碳价、外部收益、边际减排成本、政府补贴及税收政策对企业碳减排行为的影响。研究表明:碳价、税率、补贴率、外部收益及边际减排成本在阈值区间内对企业"减排"有正向激励作用,在区间外效果不显著,其中税率与补贴率具有同等效力,边际减排成本优于外部收益。另外,这些因素和市场均衡的接近程度与市场稳定正相关。最后分别从政府和企业角度提出相应政策和建议。Based on the theory of system dynamics, an evolutionary game model of carbon emission reduction between government and enterprises is established. The effects of carbon price, external income, marginal emission reduction cost, government subsidy and tax policy on enterprises’ carbon emission reduction behavior are analyzed by numerical simulation. The results show that carbon price, tax rate, subsidy rate, external revenue and marginal emission reduction cost have positive incentive effect on enterprise emission reduction within the threshold interval, but have no significant effect outside the threshold interval. Tax rate and subsidy rate have the same effect, and marginal emission reduction cost is superior to external revenue. In addition, the proximity of these factors to market equilibrium is positively correlated with market stability. Finally, corresponding policies and management suggestions are offered from the perspective of government and enterprise, respectively.

关 键 词：碳交易 企业减排 系统动力学 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]