协调博弈视角下深圳市城中村改造模式的逻辑演替  

Logical succession of the transformation model of villages in Shenzhen from the perspective of coordination game

作　　者：李画儿 黎斌 刘青[2] 李贵才[3] LI Hua-er

机构地区：[1]澳门城市大学创新设计学院 [2]北京大学深圳研究生院 [3]北京大学城市规划与设计学院

出　　处：《城市问题》2021年第8期55-62,共8页Urban Problems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(41871154)。

摘　　要：借助协调博弈的分析框架,基于深圳城中村改造模式的逻辑演替,对刚性约束模式、弹性规划模式和单元规划模式进行了描述和解析,分析了各个模式背后促进合作的动力机制,以及参与主体达成合作的博弈均衡条件和协调失败的原因。在此基础上,本文提出了要促使合作达成必须提高博弈参与人的互信程度,为了增加信任应通过制度设计改善支付函数、信息结构和第三方监管。Base on the analysis framework of coordination game,this paper describes the transformation process of Shenzhen urban village redevelopment model,which including strictregulation model,flexible planning model and urban renewal unit model. Then it analyzes the motivation mechanism to promote cooperation behind each model,as well as the equilibrium conditions to reach cooperation and the reasons for the failure of coordination. On this basis,this article proposes that in order to promote cooperation,it is necessary to increase the degree of mutual trust among the players in the game. Specific measures can be implemented,such as the improvement of pay-off function,information structure and third-party enforcement.

关 键 词：城中村 协调博弈 城市更新 深圳 

分 类 号：F299.276.53[经济管理—国民经济]