高管金融背景、外部监督与非金融企业影子银行化  

Financial Background of Executives,External Supervision and Non-financial Enterprises’Shadow Banking Activities

作　　者：胡金焱[1] 张晓帆 HU Jinyan;ZHANG Xiaofan

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《济南大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期101-116,176,共17页Journal of University of Jinan:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“网络借贷市场风险识别、传染与防控研究:基于复杂网络理论的视角”(项目编号:71873079)之阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：在经济发展新常态下,实体经济步入了新旧动能转换、结构性改革的阵痛期,正规金融服务的缺失催生了规模庞大的影子银行体系。在此背景下,基于高阶梯队理论,以2010—2019年中国沪深两市A股非金融上市公司为样本,理论和实证分析了高管特征对非金融企业开展影子银行业务的影响,探讨了内在传导机制及外部监督作用。研究结果表明,高管的金融背景通过提升管理层的风险偏好进而促进非金融企业的影子银行化。分析师关注、机构投资者持股、期末报表审计等外部监督对管理层有一定的约束作用,削弱了高管金融背景对非金融企业影子银行化的影响。研究结果为企业治理、行业监管等提供了一定的政策启示。With China’s economy entering the new normal,non-financial enterprises are increasing their shadow banking investment because finance is being diverted out of the real economy,leading to a further decline in industrial investment rate.Based on high echelon theory,this paper analyzes the impact of executives’financial background on non-financial enterprises’shadow banking investment by using data from 2010 to 2019 on listed non-financial firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China.Empirical results show that the financial background of executives promotes non-financial enterprises’shadow banking investment by enhancing executives’risk preference.In addition,analyst attention,institutional investor shareholding,and period-end statement audits all have supervisory effects on management,which inhibit the effect of executives’financial background on firms’shadow banking.This paper enriches the research related to executive characteristics and corporate shadow banking,and provides policy implications for corporate governance and industry regulation.

关 键 词：影子银行 非金融企业 企业金融化 金融监管 高阶梯队理论 

分 类 号：F06.1[经济管理—政治经济学]