转向“灾难外交”:切尔诺贝利事故中戈尔巴乔夫政府的外交行为探究  

Turning to “Disaster Diplomacy”: the Diplomatic Conduct of Gorbachev Administration in the Chernobyl Accident

作　　者：张菊萍 Zhang Juping

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学历史学系

出　　处：《俄罗斯研究》2021年第6期74-96,共23页Russian Studies

基　　金：2014年度国家社科基金重大项目“苏联解体过程的俄国档案文献收集整理与研究”(项目批准号:14ZDB062)的研究成果。

摘　　要：切尔诺贝利事故发生之初,苏联政府围绕事故开展的外交行为,实际上是决策层内部两派之间出现意见分歧的结果,并与决策参与者各自秉持的对外战略思想相关联。一派以葛罗米柯为代表,主张围绕事故开展的政府外交行为应相对保守,即以"灾难不外交"为主要表现形式;另一派以戈尔巴乔夫、雅科夫列夫为代表,谋求更加开放的政府外交行为,即"灾难外交"。在救灾过程中,苏联政府的外交行为逐渐由"灾难不外交"转向"灾难外交"。这种转向既是由救灾需求所导致,也有戈氏在外交领域的改革意图作为思想前提。转向"灾难外交"虽意味着苏联政府起初的救灾方式确有失误,但也为戈尔巴乔夫的对外战略新思维提供了进一步发展的契机。At the beginning of the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet government’s related diplomatic conduct was actually the result of different opinions between two parties within decision-makers. It was also interrelated to the diplomatic strategic thinking held by participants in decision-making. One group, represented by Gromyko, advocated that the government diplomatic conduct regarding accidents should be relatively conservative, that is, “no diplomacy for disaster” as the main manifestation. On the contrary, the other group, represented by Gorbachev and Yakovlev, sought more open government diplomacy, that is, “disaster diplomacy”. During the disaster relief, the Soviet government’s diplomatic conduct gradually changed from the former to the latter.This shift is not only caused by the need for disaster relief, but also due to Gorbachev’s reform intentions in the diplomatic field as an ideological prerequisite. Although the shift to “disaster diplomacy” meant that the Soviet government made mistakes with regards to its initial disaster relief methods, yet it also provided an opportunity for Gorbachev to further develop his new diplomatic strategic thinking.

关 键 词：切尔诺贝利事故 戈尔巴乔夫外交“新思维” “灾难外交” 

分 类 号：D83[政治法律—政治学]