分权式环境规制下城市群污染跨区域协同治理路径研究  

Research on Collaborative Governance Path of Cross Regional Pollution in Urban Agglomeration under Decentralized Environmental Regulation

作　　者：张艳楠 孙蕾 张宏梅 孙娜[3] ZHANG Yan-nan;SUN Lei;ZHANG Hong-mei;SUN Na(School of Tourism,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China;Business Economics Department,Shanghai Business School,Shanghai 200235,China;Shanghai Normal University Tianhua College,Shanghai 201815,China)

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学旅游学院,上海200234 [2]上海商学院商务经济学院,上海200235 [3]上海师范大学天华学院,上海200093

出　　处：《长江流域资源与环境》2021年第12期2925-2937,共13页Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin

基　　金：上海市科技人才计划项目青年科技英才扬帆计划项目(19YF1437000);国家自然科学基金面上项目(41971254);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71771151);教育部人文社科青年项目(21YJC630120);上海师范大学高峰高原学科-工商管理。

摘　　要：以分权式环境规制为背景,针对聚合式发展的城市群出现的环境激化问题,引入地方政府的治理成本、机会成本、治理收益等合作性参数,及中央政府的经济激励、经济补贴等政策性参数,构建一种新的城市群污染跨区域协同治理路径三方演化博弈模型。同时分别对不同主体进行策略选择研究,分析主体策略选择的影响因素及相互作用关系,确定系统均衡稳定策略及其存在的条件。通过对不同策略组合的演化过程进行仿真模拟,探究分权式环境规制下城市群污染跨区域协同治理路径,提出建立激励与约束机制、联防联控机制、区域一体化协同机制发展建议。研究表明:对于地方政府,选择"合作行为"的概率与其他地方政府选择"合作行为"的概率、中央政府选择"严格督查"的概率呈正相关;中央政府选择"严格督查"的概率与地方政府选择"合作行为"的概率呈负相关。对于系统稳定策略,主体策略的演化速度会受到自身及其他主体策略选择比例的影响,但无论比例取值如何变化,都不会改变群体的最终策略决策。In the paper,a new tripartite evolutionary game model analyzing collaborative governance path of cross regional pollution in Urban Agglomeration is constructed based on decentralized environmental regulation.In order to solve environmental problems under aggregate development,cooperative parameters of local government,including governance cost,opportunity cost and governance income,and policy parameters of the central government such as economic incentives and subsidies are mainly considered.Moreover,the strategy selection of different subjects is studied which discusses the influencing factors and interaction relationship.And the equilibrium stability strategy of the system with existence conditions is determined.At last,the evolution process of different strategy combinations is simulated.Then some suggestions are put forward to establish incentive and restraint mechanism,joint prevention and control mechanism,and regional integration and coordination mechanism.The results are shown below.For local governments,the probability of choosing cooperative behavior will increase with the probability of other local governments choosing cooperative behavior and the probability of central government choosing strict supervision.While the probability of central government choosing strict supervision will increase with the decrease of the probability of local government choosing cooperative behavior.The evolution speed of system stability strategy is affected by the proportion of its own and other agents’strategy selection.No matter how the proportion value changes,the final strategy decision of the group will not be changed.

关 键 词：分权式 环境规制 城市群 跨区域污染协同治理 演化博弈 

分 类 号：X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]