被动担责与集体共谋:基层官员问责应对策略的类型学考察  

Passive Responsibility and Collective Collusion:A Typological Study of the Accountability Coping Strategies of Grassroots-Level Officials

作　　者：赵聚军[1] 张昊辰 Zhao Jujun;Zhang Haochen

机构地区：[1]南开大学周恩来政府管理学院 [2]复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院

出　　处：《江苏社会科学》2022年第1期125-136,I0004,I0005,共14页Jiangsu Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“特大城市基层治理中的社会整合与管理体制优化研究”(19AZZ008)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：十八大以来掀起的问责风暴,已经由最初的党风廉政建设利器演变为政策执行的重要助推器.,相应地,问责事件实际演化为个人和工作两种主要类型,前者主要契合党风廉政建设的初衷,后者则主要致力于推动政策执行。基于对X县部分官员的深度访谈和参与式观察,以问责事件的类型为依据,将基层官贸的应对策略归纳为两类四种:针对个人问题的被动担责;针对工作问题的结构避责、私下合谋与理性避责。研究发现:针对个人问题的问责,通常只能被动担责;针对工作问题的问责,基层官员则会综合考虑问责主体和政治场域、问责事项与责任大小,以及自身的政治地位和社会关系网络、职业发展前景等因素,理性选择应对策略,集体共谋色彩浓厚。这就从一个侧面反映出:持续的高压问责直接推动了党风廉政建设的重大胜利,但作为政策执行工具,并未完全达到预期效果。究其原因,职责同构和压力型体制所诱发的基层权责失衡,以及县域相对稳定的社会场域,构成了基层官员问责应对策略生成的体制和社会根源。论文的主要学术贡献是基于扎实的田野证据,对常见的分析范式进行了证伪,有助于推动研究的本土化进程。The accountability campaign launched since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has evolved from a tool for building a clean and honest party-state to an important booster for policy implementation.Accordingly,accountability has actually evolved into two basic types:private issues and work issues.The former mainly promotes the construction of a clean and honest party-state,while the latter mainly guarantees policy implementation.Based on in-depth interviews and participatory observations with some officials in X County,and based on the types of accountability,the coping strategies of grassroots officials are divided into two categories and four subcategories:passive responsibility for private issues;structural avoidance of responsibility for work issues,private collusion and rational avoidance of responsibility.The study found that grassroots officials usually have to passively shoulder the responsibility for private issues while for work issues they will make a rational choice of coping strategies by comprehensively considering the accountability subjects,the political field,accountability issues and responsibilities,as well as their political status,social network and career development,where there is a strong color of collective collusion.It can be found that although continuous high-pressure accountability has greatly promoted the construction of a clean and honest party-state,it has not fully achieved the expected results as a tool for policy implementation.The reason is that the imbalance of power and responsibility at the grassroots level induced by the isomorphic responsibilities and the pressure-oriented system,as well as the relatively stable social field at the county level,constitutes the institutional and social root of grassroots officials'accountability coping strategies.The main contribution of the present paper is to falsify common analysis paradigms based on solid field evidence,which helps to improve the localization of research.

关 键 词：基层官员 问责常态化 党风廉政建设 政策执行 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]