车联网环境下车辆换道博弈行为及模型  

Game behavior and model of lane-changing on the internet of vehicles environment

作　　者：曲大义 黑凯先 郭海兵 贾彦峰 王韬 QU Da-yi;HEI Kai-xian;GUO Hai-bing;JIA Yan-feng;WANG Tao(School of Mechanical and Automotive Engineering,QingDao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学机械与汽车工程学院,山东青岛266520

出　　处：《吉林大学学报（工学版）》2022年第1期101-109,共9页Journal of Jilin University:Engineering and Technology Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(51678320,51178231).

摘　　要：车联网环境中,交通系统将长期呈现智能网联汽车和传统人工驾驶车辆混合共存的状况,聚焦智能网联交通环境下的新型混合车流,建立了车辆换道行为的决策模型。引入车辆换道过程中动态风险模型,建立网联混合交通流自主车辆与传统车辆的交互作用关系;基于博弈论的思想进行混合交通流中自主车辆换道行为建模。自主车辆之间的换道行为非合作博弈的性质,车辆以自身行驶状态为博弈收益,寻求行驶条件更优的车道。运用SUMO软件对提出的换道行为模型进行了仿真验证分析,仿真结果表明,博弈换道模型相比于传统间隙阈值接受模型具有更高的车道利用率和安全稳定性。In the vehicle network environment,the traffic system will present the mixed coexistence of intelligent connected vehicles and traditional artificially driven vehicles for a long time.Focusing on the new mixed traffic flow in the intelligent connected traffic environment,the decision-making model of vehicle lane change behavior was established.The dynamic risk model during lane-changing is introduced to establish the interaction between autonomous vehicles and traditional vehicles in the mixed traffic flow.The lane-changing behavior of autonomous vehicles in mixed traffic flow is modelled based on game theory.Lane-changing behavior between autonomous vehicles is the nature of the non-cooperative game.Vehicles seek for a lane with better driving conditions by taking their own driving state as the game benefit.The simulation results show that the game lane-changing model has higher lane utilization and safety stability than the traditional gap threshold acceptance model.

关 键 词：交通工程 换道行为 博弈论 SUMO软件 动态风险模型 

分 类 号：U491.2[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]