基于博弈论视角的稀土矿区环境治理及监管策略研究  

Research on Environmental Governance and Supervision Strategy of Rare Earth Mining Area Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王秀丽[1] 张哲源 李恒凯[2] WANG Xiu-li;ZHANG Zhe-yuan;LI Heng-kai(College of Economic Management, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou 341000,China;College of Architecture and Surveying Engineering, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou 341000, China)

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学经济管理学院,江西赣州341000 [2]江西理工大学建筑与测绘工程学院,江西赣州341000

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第1期46-51,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究项目规划基金(18YJAZH040);江西理工大学繁荣哲学社会科学研究项目(FZ19-YB-01)。

摘　　要：针对稀土矿区环境治理的复杂性,本文通过建立地方政府和稀土企业之间的动态演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方在不同情形下的演化稳定策略及其影响因素,并利用matlab对其进行数值仿真。研究表明,地方政府的监管成本、执行环境规制时对稀土企业的奖惩政策、稀土企业的治污成本以及非法开采时的额外收益都会影响地方政府与稀土企业的演化稳定策略,降低地方政府的监管成本、稀土企业的治污成本等都会引导博弈双方的演化稳定策略趋向于{严格监管,合法开采},从而促进矿区环境的可持续性发展。In view of the complexity of environmental governance in rare earth mining areas,this paper establishes a dynamic evolutionary game model between local governments and rare earth enterprises,analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies and influencing factors of both parties in different situations,and carries out numerical simulation with MATLAB.The research shows that the regulatory cost of local governments,the reward and punishment policies for rare earth enterprises when implementing environmental regulations,the pollution control cost of rare earth enterprises and the additional income during illegal mining would affect the evolutionary stability strategy of local governments and rare earth enterprises,and reduce the regulatory cost of local governments The pollution control cost of rare earth enterprises would guide the evolutionary stability strategy of both sides of the game to{strict supervision and legal mining},so as to promote the sustainable development of the mining area environment.

关 键 词：演化博弈 地方政府 稀土企业 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]