考虑水资源税下的电厂与电网之间双重边际效应模型  

Modeling of Double Marginalization between the Power Plant and the Power Grid under the Water Resources Tax

作　　者：吴志樵[1] 牛宇超 康亚玲 唐加福[1] WU Zhi-qiao;NIU Yu-chao;KANG Ya-ling;TANG Jia-fu(College of Management Science&Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第1期142-148,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：澜沧江流域水资源的多利益主体协同分配机制与优化调度研究(91747105)。

摘　　要：以电厂和电网分开政策下引发的双重边际效应为背景,建立了考虑水资源税的序贯博弈模型。在“厂网分开”背景下,探讨了水资源税对博弈参与方(电厂、电网)最优决策、供应链效率的影响。考察了影响上网电价及供应链效率的主要因素。结论显示,水资源税的下调会负向影响电厂最优电价,进而促进电厂售电量、提升其净利润,最终削弱双重边际效应,改善了供应链效率。此外,本文运用数值算例验证了主要研究发现。The paper establishes the sequential game model considering the water resourcestax based on the background of the double marginalization caused by the policy of“plant-net separation”.Under the background of“plant-net separation”,the impact of water resources tax on the optimal decision-making of the game participants(power plants,power grids)and the efficiency of the supply chain are discussed.The main factors affecting on-grid tariff and supply chain efficiency are investigated.The conclusion shows that the reduction of the water resources tax will negatively affect the optimal power price of power plants,which in turn will promote power sales of power plants and increase their net profit,and ultimately weaken the double marginalization and improve the efficiency of the supply chain.In addition,this paper uses numerical examples to verify the main research findings.

关 键 词：双重边际效应 厂网分开 水资源税 供应链效率 

分 类 号：TP311.5[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论]