税收筹划与上市公司信息不对称问题研究--基于公司治理结构的视角  

Research on Tax Planning and Asymmetry of Listed Companies:Based on the Structure of Corporate Governance

作　　者：丁宏[1] 陈恩霖 屈梦希 Ding Hong;Chen Enlin;Qu Mengxi(School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;School of Econom-ics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;Harris School of Public Policy,the Uni-versity of Chicago,Chicago 60637,USA)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,300071 [2]芝加哥大学哈里斯公共政策学院,60637

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2021年第5期140-157,共18页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学规划项目“内生人口变化对长期经济增长的影响--基于财政政策的视角”(TJYJ20-002);国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代中国预算绩效管理改革研究”(19ZDA071);南开大学数字经济研究中心的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于公司治理结构视角,探讨企业从事税收筹划对信息不对称状况的影响,阐述了企业的公司治理结构会对税收筹划的风险性产生影响。本文以我国2015—2018年沪深两市所有A股上市公司为研究对象,采用固定效应模型对面板数据进行分析。实证分析发现:企业从事税收筹划会导致经理人和公司股东之间的信息不对称的问题更加严重;经理人和股东存在的委托代理关系也影响着税收筹划与信息不对称之间的关联性;独立董事占董事会比例更高的公司,越有利于降低税收筹划与信息不对称之间的正向关系;董事会规模越大的公司,越不会提高税收筹划与信息不对称之间的正向关系;管理层持股比例较高的公司,有助于降低税收筹划与信息不对称之间的正向关系;机构投资者持股比例高的公司,不会影响税收筹划与信息不对称之间的正向关系。There are significant differences in effective tax rates between different companies,which may be related to the degree of tax planning carried out by the companies.Based on the agency perspective,this paper discusses the impact of tax planning on information asymmetry.At the same time,the structure of corporate governance may have an impact on the risk of tax planning.This article analyzes whether the current corporate governance environment in China is beneficial to the relationship between tax planning and information asymmetry.In this paper,the research object includes all the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2015 to 2018.This paper uses the fixed-effect model to analyze the panel data.The empirical results points out that:Companies engaged in tax planning will result in increasing information asymmetry between managers and company shareholders.Moreover,the principalagent relation between managers and shareholders also affects the correlation between tax plan-ning and information asymmetry.Companies with a higher proportion of independent directors help reduce the positive relationship between tax planning and information asymmetry;companies with higher board sizes will not increase the positive relationship between tax planning and information asymmetry;companies with higher level of managerial share ownership help reduce the positive relationship between tax planning and information asymmetry;companies with a high share of institutional investors will not affect the positive relationship between tax planning and information asymmetry.

关 键 词：公司治理 税收筹划 信息不对称 会计税收差异 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学] F832.51F271