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作 者:李飞 胡毅 张奇[1] Li Fei;Hu Yi;Zhang Qi(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190;Key Laboratory of Big Data Mining and Knowledge Management,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190)
机构地区:[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190 [2]中国科学院大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室,北京100190
出 处:《管理评论》2021年第12期295-302,共8页Management Review
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(72073124);中国科学院大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室开放课题资助。
摘 要:组织管理是企业构成的基本框架,组织管理模式的选择决定了企业能否有效运行。本文创新性地从定量角度研究组织管理模式对企业成长性的影响,将公司治理作为组织管理模式的代理变量,以沪深A股2000—2019年上市公司为研究对象,从股权结构、董事会结构、高管激励三个维度进行探究。结果表明,过高的股权集中度会损害企业成长,但是董事会规模、独立董事所占比例、高管薪酬激励及高管持股均能显著促进企业成长。进一步地,能源企业因其在国民经济中的重要地位及企业组织管理模式的特殊性,文章将沪深A股上市的121家能源企业作为研究对象进行深入研究。发现股权集中度与高管薪酬激励的结论与整体一致。与其他企业不同的是,对于能源企业而言,董事会规模、独立董事所占比例及高管持股激励与企业成长性的关系并不显著。Organizational management is the basic framework of enterprise formation,and the choice of organizational management mode determines whether an enterprise can operate effectively.This paper innovatively studies the influence of organizational management model on the growth of enterprises from a quantitative perspective and uses corporate governance as a proxy variable of the organizational management model to analyze the companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchages during 2000 to 2019 from three dimensions:equity structure,board structure,and executive incentives.The results show that the growth of a company will be harmed by over-concentration of shareholding,but significantly promoted by proper size of the board of directors,proper proportion of independent directors,right amount of compensation incentives paid to executives and proper percentage of shares held by senior management.Furthermore,because of the importance of energy companies to the national economy and the particularity of their organization and management model,this paper takes 121 A-share listed energy companies as the research objects for an in-depth research.It is found that the above conclusion regarding shareholding concentration and executive compensation incentive is true of the 121 energy companies.Unlike other companies,energy companies display an insignificant relationship between their growth and board size,independent director proportion and executive shareholding.
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