委托代理理论视角下特种设备安全监管改进研究  

Research on safety supervision improvement of special equipment from a perspective of principal-agent theory

作　　者：王庆[1] WANG Qing(School of Management&Engineering,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学管理工程学院,北京100070

出　　处：《中国安全科学学报》2022年第1期20-26,共7页China Safety Science Journal

基　　金：北京市教育委员会科技计划一般项目(KM202110028002)。

摘　　要：针对特种设备数量和种类不断增多与安全监管力量不足问题,首先阐述特种设备安全监管内涵,分析其涉及的委托代理关系;然后基于委托代理理论构建特种设备安全监管委托代理数学模型,并利用激励相容约束条件讨论监管力度、安全投入、公众信任度等因素对特种设备安全监管效果的影响及内在机制;最后提出进一步提高特种设备安全水平的改进策略。结果表明:加大事故处罚与增加监察频率等方法可以促使企业认真履行特种设备安全工作职责;在事故率已大幅降低背景下,增加监察频率以督促企业提高特种设备安全水平的效果将愈发不明显;安全投入成本越高,特种设备安全监管越容易失效;企业由高安全水平能获得更多额外溢价收益,将有助于实现特种设备安全监管目标。In order to address the problem of increasing number and types of special equipment and lack of safety supervision,firstly,connotation of the special equipment's safety supervision was explained,and principal-agent relationship of it was analyzed.Then,a mathematical model was established based on principal-agent theory,and influence of factors such as supervision intensity,safety investment,public trust,on safety supervision effect and their internal mechanism were analyzed by using incentive compatibility constraint condition.Finally,an improvement strategy for safety supervision was proposed.The results show that intensifying punishment for accidents and increasing frequency for supervision can promote enterprises to work harder on ensuring safety of special equipment.Under the background that accident rate has been greatly reduced,the effect of promoting enterprises to further improve safety level by increasing supervision frequency will become less obvious.The higher safety investment is,the easier safety supervision tends to fail.However,it will help them to achieve safety goals if they can gain more additional income from high safety level of special equipment.

关 键 词：特种设备 委托代理理论 安全监管 安全经济学 激励相容原则 

分 类 号：X915.4[环境科学与工程—安全科学]