气候变化博弈的均衡分析  

Equilibrium analysis on climate change game

作　　者：王荧 李登峰 WANG Ying;LI Dengfeng(Finance College,Fujian Jiangxia University,Fuzhou 350108,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)

机构地区：[1]福建江夏学院金融学院,福州350108 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第12期3178-3198,共21页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(15BJY080);国家社会科学基金重大项目(20&ZD084)。

摘　　要：针对气候变化博弈,定义了一种新的合作博弈的解的概念——w-core,并进一步论证了:在各国均追求自身福利最大化、各国排放收益函数是严格递增和严格凹、各国的损害函数是严格递增和严格凸的前提下,w-core是气候变化博弈的均衡解方案.w-core是γ-core的子集,并且奠基在市场机制的基础上,考虑了使市场均衡实现帕累托最优的环境政策,不仅存在并且具有唯一性,因此,在分析气候变化博弈这样的环境治理合作博弈的问题中,w-core比γ-core更具吸引力.w-core较好地解释了现实国际气候谈判中,自上而下"摊牌式"的强制减排机制必须向自下而上的"国家自主贡献"转变的原因.This paper introduces a new solution concept,called the w-core,for the climate change game,and proved that w-core is the solution of climate change game under the assumptions that(1)all countries seek to maximize their own welfare,(2)the emission revenue functions are strictly increasing and strictly concave,the damage functions are strictly increasing and convex.The w-core is the subset of γ-core,and is based on the market mechanism,considering the rules that make the market equilibrium to achieve Pareto-optimality,and has uniqueness,so that it is a theoretically more compelling solution concept than γ-core for environmental governance cooperation game such as climate change game.The w-core well explains the reason why the mandatory emission reduction mechanism must be changed to the"nationally determined contribution"mechanism in current international climate negotiations.

关 键 词：气候变化博弈 博弈均衡 合作博弈 全球气候治理最优状态 财政收支平衡 w-core 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]