协作配送中成员退出联盟的违约追偿和损失补偿机制  

The mechanism used to the penalty for breach of contract and compensation for the loss considering members withdraw from the formed alliance in collaborative distribution

作　　者：饶卫振[1] 徐丰 段忠菲 RAO Weizhen;XU Feng;DUAN Zhongfei(School of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,青岛266590

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第12期3260-3281,共22页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：山东省泰山学者青年专家资助项目(tsqn201909111);山东省社会科学基金(20CGLG32);山东省高等学校优秀青年创新团队(2019RWG010);教育部人文社科基金一般项目(21YJA630075)。

摘　　要：传统的协作配送研究均假设任何成员不退出联盟,但在实际中,联盟成立后存在成员退出合作的违约情况.合理评估成员由于自身原因在任务开始前退出联盟后的违约成本具有重要意义.首先以未违约成员的成本节约量不减少为原则,设计成员退出联盟的违约追偿和损失补偿机制;其次构建总违约成本量化模型,并提出多个违约成员间的总违约成本分摊方法;最后量化每个未违约成员的损失补偿.通过数值实验,验证了联盟中任意成员的离开会对每个未违约成员造成一定程度损失.结果表明:1)当单个成员退出联盟后会明显减少未违约成员的总节约成本,一般情况下减少幅度可达23.64%~30.44%.当违约成员数量较多时,未违约成员的成本节约总量可减少45%以上,甚至是100%;2)若某个成员在联盟中的位置越重要,则该成员退出会导致每个未违约成员的成本节约量减少越多,其应承担的违约成本也越高.因此,在协作配送联盟成立前,有必要设计好公平的违约追偿和补偿机制,以保护成员正当利益.Traditional research on collaborative distribution has been carried out under the assumption that the collaborating members would not leave the formed alliance.However,in practice,some of the members withdraw after the formation of the coalition and breach the contract.Therefore,it is of great importance to conduct a reasonable assessment of the default costs of those members who leave the coalition prior to the task for their own reasons.Firstly,in the case of withdrawal by alliance members,a mechanism used to the penalty for breach of the contract and compensation for the loss should be defined to ensure that no reduction in the cost savings of non-defaulting members.Secondly,in this work,a mathematical model of quantifying the total default costs was developed,and a scientific allocation method was proposed on how to share the total default costs if multiple members leave the alliance.Finally,this paper quantified the compensation for the loss of each non-defaulting member.Through experiments and comparative analysis,it is verified that the leaving of any member from the alliance will cause a certain degree of loss to each of the remaining non-defaulting members.The results demonstrate that the total cost savings of remaining members will be significantly reduced as the result of the departure of a member of the alliance.Under the given assumptions,the reduction in cost savings ranged between 23.64%and 30.44%.In addition,in the case of more than one defaulting member,the total cost savings of other non-defaulting members in the alliance can be reduced by more than 45%up to 100%.If the more important a member’s position in the alliance is,once this member breaches the contract,the greater the reduction in cost saving for each non-defaulting member will be,consequently,this member has to carry higher default costs.This work has demonstrated the necessity for designing a fair and reasonable mechanism used to the penalty for breach of contract and compensation for the loss before the establishment of collaborati

关 键 词：SHAPLEY值法 协作配送 成本节约量 违约成本评估 

分 类 号：C94[自然科学总论—系统科学] N949