波普尔的心灵哲学遗产:对交互主义二元论的捍卫  

The Heritage of Popper’s Philosophy of Mind:In Defence of Dualist-Interactionism

作　　者：刘牧 LIU Mu(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100089,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100089

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2021年第12期26-32,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：中国人民大学“双一流”跨学科重大创新规划平台——哲学与认知科学跨学科交叉平台支持。

摘　　要：波普尔通过"宏大归谬"论证了心理状态及心灵对象的实在性,并同时回应了不同版本的物理主义。该论证的实质在于诉诸自然选择理论与物理主义心灵观的不相容,从而捍卫一种独特的交互主义二元论。尽管这一工作在当时物理主义的浪潮中遭遇了冷落,但仍然被视为在20世纪中对二元论最具分量的辩护之一。随着近年来在物理主义之外的另类选项声势渐起,这一富有前瞻性的工作也理应得到更细致的考察。On account of his so-called “grand reductio”,Karl Popper argued for the reality of mental states and mental objects.He then refuted four diverse versions of physicalism.The kernel of his argument appealed to the incompatibility between natural selection theory and physicalist account of mind and thus defends the body-mind interaction.Although this work was underrated in the movement of mainstream physicalism at that time,it has still been thought of as the most significant defence of the dualist-interactionism in the last century.As the overwhelming of alternative choices beyond the physicalism,this work should gain the deserved revaluation.

关 键 词：交互主义 二元论 波普尔 物理主义 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]