我国服装市场假冒品牌现象的原因--基于信号博弈均衡分析  

Cause of imitation brands in China’s garment market:based on the equilibrium analysis of signaling game

作　　者：黄冬景 Huang Dongjing(Department of Garment,Quanzhou Textile Garment Vocational Institute,Shishi 362700,China)

机构地区：[1]泉州纺织服装职业学院服装系,福建石狮362700

出　　处：《纺织报告》2022年第1期39-41,共3页

摘　　要：针对我国服装市场假冒品牌现象,文章分析了服装买卖交易过程中服装企业和消费者之间的信号博弈问题,并以两者利益最大化为目标,建立了动态信号博弈模型。结果发现,均衡的效率与服装企业的诚信度和伪装成本有关,因此,提高服装企业的伪装成本和加大假冒品牌的惩罚力度是打击服装零售市场假冒品牌现象、规范服装市场的有效手段。According to the phenomenon of imitation brand in China’s garment market,this paper analyzes the signaling game question during the transaction process between garment enterprises and customers,and establishes a dynamic signaling game model with the goal of maximizing their benefits.The result is that equilibrium efficiency is relevant to the credibility and disguise costs of garment enterprises,so enhancing disguise cost of garment enterprises and increasing punishment for imitation brands are effective means to crack down on the phenomenon of imitation brands in the garment retail market and standardize the garment market.

关 键 词：假冒品牌 信号博弈 诚信度 伪装成本 

分 类 号：F426.86[经济管理—产业经济]