Strategic Response to a Powerful Downstream Retailer:Difference-Setting Wholesale Pricing Contract and Partial Forward Integration  

作　　者：Conglin Hu Bin Liu Yunhui Liu 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai,China,201306 [2]Research Center for Contemporary Management,Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities,School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》2022年第1期89-110,共22页系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）

基　　金：the support from National Natural and Science Foundation of China with Grant Number 71971134.

摘　　要：We study a supply chain consisted of a supplier and both retailers,and the supplier sells a single product through a dominant retailer and a weak retailer.The aggressive bargaining behavior of the dominant retailer brings the supplier much concern and two feasible strategies are presented to respond to that:difference-setting wholesale pricing contract and integration with the weak retailer.We investigate the decisions of supply chain members under each solution and find that,compared to the traditional form,the supplier always benefits from announcing the difference-setting wholesale pricing contract for it not only raises the marginal wholesale profits of both channels but also reduces the market share of the dominant retailer,thus potentially weakening its channel power.In addition,we show that combining with the weak retailer is not a wise choice for suppliers when the dominant retailer with relatively little bargaining power enjoys a large market share.Finally,by comparing the equilibria of these two solutions,we find that the optimal choice for suppliers depends not only on the difference in market share but also on the dominant retailer's bargaining power in the negotiation.

关 键 词：Channel power BARGAINING wholesale-price contract forward integration 

分 类 号：F724.2[经济管理—产业经济]