信息扩张与信念修正  

Information Expansion and Belief Revision

作　　者：林艺霏 任晓明 LIN Yifei;REN Xiaoming

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院,天津300350 [2]四川大学哲学系,四川成都610207

出　　处：《贵州民族大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第6期196-208,共13页Journal of Guizhou Minzu University:Philosophy and Social Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“现代归纳逻辑的新发展、理论前沿与应用研究”(15ZDB018)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：AGM理论认为,不一致是地狱。当有新信息输入信念时,我们应该禁止扩张到不一致,而用替代的方式修正信念。艾萨克·莱维驳斥了这一观点,提出了区分审议扩张和常规扩张的扩张方式。然后,以信息价值和避免错误为标准,借用效用函数对扩张进行评估。最终得出审议扩张到不一致是不合法的扩张,但是常规扩张到不一致有时是合法的结论,同时驳斥了替代在AGM理论中是信念合法改变的基本类型。但是,莱维的信念修正理论存在着许多不足和缺陷,有待我们进一步讨论。The AGM theory assumes that inconsistency is a hell.In the event of new information entering the belief,we should prohibit expansion reaching inconsistency,and the replacement is belief revision.Isaac Levi refuted this idea,proposing that we should distinguish deliberate expansion from routine expansion.Then,with information value and error avoidance as standards,we can refer to utility functions for the assessment of expansion.Finally,we can know that deliberate expansion reaching inconsistency is illegal expansion but sometimes routine expansion reaching inconsistency is legal;meanwhile can refute the idea that replacement is the basic type for legal belief change in the AGM theory.However,Levi’s belief revision shows many shortcomings and deficiencies,which await further discussions.

关 键 词：信念修正 不一致性 AGM理论 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]