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作 者:张牧扬[1] 陈丽慧 MUYANG ZHANG;LIHUI CHEN(China Public Finance Institute,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;RATINGDOG(Shenzben)Information Technology Co.Ltd.)
机构地区:[1]上海财经大学中国公共财政研究院 [2]瑞霆狗(深圳)信息技术有限公司估值研究部
出 处:《工信财经科技》2021年第6期79-104,共26页Review of Financial & Technological Economics
摘 要:本文研究在规范PPP项目财政支出的政策下,政府在项目运营期的补贴支出和项目资本金中的股权支出替代关系。研究中国公路PPP项目的分析发现,当PPP项目财政支出比例接近7%或10%的财政承受能力(以下称"财承")红线时,社会资本方会显著地减少其在项目资本金中的股权比重。根据政策规定,地方财承超过7%时,会得到风险警示,一旦财承超过10%,将被限制发起新的PPP项目。为了避免因"踩线"而影响新项目执行,当PPP项目财承接近7%或者超过7%逐渐接近10%时,政府会减少项目后续执行阶段的补贴支出,减少的运营补贴就由社会资本方来承担。作为回应,社会资本方会减少在项目资本金中的股权支出以保障项目的内部收益率。In this paper, we explore local government’s trade-off between capital expenditure at the start and subsidy payment during the operation of a project when it is faced with tightened regulation on fiscal expenditure on PPP projects. Using data from China’s highway projects, we find that when total fiscal expenditure on PPP projects is close to 7% or 10% of total expenditure in the general budget, the private partners significantly reduce equity shares. This phenomenon is one of local government’s efforts to avoid tighter regulation once the expenditure shares reach 7% or 10%. Such efforts decrease subsidy payment during the operation of a project, and in turn, must be compensated by increases in initial capital expenditure to maintain certain internal rates of return.
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