司法审查之外对官僚行政的控制  

Constraining Bureaucracy Beyond Judicial Review

作　　者： 徐曦昊(译) 宋华琳(译)[1] Christopher J.Walker

机构地区：[1]南开大学法学院,天津300350

出　　处：《湖湘法学评论》2021年第2期149-160,共12页HUXIANG LAW REVIEW

摘　　要：现代行政国家的理论争议在学术论辩过程中发展出了"行政至上论""行政怀疑论"等不同理论阵营,而着眼于行政合法性控制的"行政实用主义"或为不同理论阵营凝聚学术共识提供了平台。司法审查并不是抵御行政机构违法的唯一制度工具,对行政机构违法的全面控制应考虑不受司法审查的官僚行政。不受司法审查的官僚行政概念应包括被立法规范或司法尊重学说排除于司法审查之外的行政机构行为和在技术上应受司法审查,但实际与司法审查几乎绝缘的行政机构行为。在司法审查之外对官僚行政的控制需要立法、司法、行政三大分支的共同参与,社会与行政机构本身也需要发挥相应作用。The theoretical debate of the modern administrative state has developed different theoretical camps such as"administrative supremacy"and"administrative skepticism",and"administrative pragmatism"focusing on legitimacy control may provide a platform for different theoretical camps to gather academic consensus.Judicial review is not the only institutional tool to defend against violations by agency.Overall control over agency overreach should take into account bureaucracy beyond judicial review.The concept of bureaucracy beyond judicial review should include not only agency actions that statute or judicial doctrine precludes from judicial review,but also agency actions that are technically subject to judicial review yet effectively insulated from it.To control bureaucracy beyond judicial review,all three branches of the federal government must play their roles,as should society and the agencies themselves.

关 键 词：行政国家 行政实用主义 超越司法审查 官僚行政 合法性控制 

分 类 号：D922.1[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]