纵向政府间行政治理结构改革与企业绩效  

Vertical Intergovernmental Administrative Governance Structure Reform and Firm Performance

作　　者：余锦亮 黄保聪 Yu Jinliang;Huang Baocong(School of Economics&Trade,Hunan University;School of Public Administration,Hunan University)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]湖南大学公共管理学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《经济科学》2022年第1期50-65,共16页Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“减税降费的财政效应评估:基于收—支—债联动的视角”(项目编号:72003060)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：打好提质增效攻坚战、提升企业绩效是当前社会各界广泛关注的热点话题,政府尤其是市县政府的政策和策略性行为在这一过程中起到极其关键的作用。本文基于2003年开始的扩权强县改革构建双重差分模型,探究纵向政府间行政治理结构改革在促进企业绩效中的作用。研究发现,与非扩权县相比,扩权县企业的产出平均提高了约11%,销售利润率和总资产利润率分别提高了5.4%和13.66%。机制分析表明,改革深刻改变了扩权县的激励约束机制:扩权县出于经济增长的激励在供给端降低了企业的进入障碍和生产经营成本。在需求端扩大了财政基本建设支出比重,创造了更大的市场需求。This paper focused on the vertical intergovernmental administrative governance structure to evaluate the microeconomic effects of the county power expansion reform(kuo quan qiang xian)in China.Using the difference-in-differences method,we found that the reform significantly increased the performance of firms in the treated group,and those firms’output,ratio of income as a percentage of sales,and return on total assets rose by about 11%,5.4% and 13.66%,respectively on average.Mechanism analysis showed that the reform would has profoundly changed the incentives of treated counties:on the supply side,the reform stimulated treated counties to loosen environmental regulation and took preferential economic policies,which might reduce firms’entry barriers and operating costs;on the demand side,treated counties’increasing proportion of fiscal expenditure on infrastructure construction would create greater market demand.

关 键 词：企业绩效 扩权强县 增长激励 政府间行政治理结构 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]