高管权力、高管薪酬粘性与企业创新  

Executive power,executive compensation stickiness and enterprise innovation

作　　者：宋力[1] 解凯然 余维田[1] SONG Li;XIE Kai-ran;YU Wei-tian(School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学管理学院,沈阳110870

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期64-69,共6页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目(L20AGL002)。

摘　　要：创新是引领发展的第一动力,是建设现代化经济体系的战略支撑。高管权力的合理运用是提高企业创新效率的关键,为企业带来丰厚利润和广阔发展前景。以2014—2019年A股上市公司为样本,通过多元线性回归分析,对高管权力与企业创新的关系进行详细研究。通过文献研究选取高管薪酬粘性作为中介变量、企业生命周期作为调节变量,得到结论:高管薪酬粘性在高管权力与企业创新投入之间有正向中介作用;在企业成长期、成熟期,高管权力促进企业创新投入;在企业衰退期,高管权力抑制企业创新投入。Innovation is the first driving force leading development and the strategic support for building a modern economic system.The rational use of executive power is the key to improve the innovation efficiency of enterprises,and bring rich profits and broad development prospects to enterprises.Taking A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019 as a sample,through multiple linear regression analysis,the relationship of executive power and enterprise innovation are studied in detail.Through literature research,executive compensation stickiness is selected as an mediating variable and enterprise life cycle as an adjusting variable.The conclusions are obtained:the executive compensation stickiness plays a positive mediating role between executive power and enterprise innovation investment;in the growth and maturity stages of enterprises,the executive power promotes enterprise innovation investment;in the stage of enterprise recession,the executive power inhibits enterprise innovation investment.

关 键 词：高管权力 高管薪酬粘性 企业创新 创新投入 生命周期 多元回归 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]