黑格尔法哲学的前提:实相的自由而非本相的自由  

The Premise of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:Real freedom,not Natural Freedom

作　　者：肖柯 Xiao Ke

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《理论界》2022年第1期38-44,共7页Theory Horizon

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“‘非物质劳动’、符号实践与传播学主体理论构建研究”(编号:20BXW054)的研究成果。

摘　　要：康德伦理学证成了基于人的非角色性存在的本相的自由,以此确立了普遍的道德规范,却使自由停留在理性王国,使道德成为抽象的"应该"。黑格尔认为康德伦理学存在三大问题:伪善、形式主义、自我确证的良心所伴随的任性的恶。黑格尔通过精神的观念性扬弃了外在性,论证了人在自己的角色性存在中能够获得实相的自由,从而使自由在经验世界的实现成为可能,进而通过伦理共同体建立的法的体系,保障了伦理规范的落实。Kant’s ethics validates the natural freedom based on the non-role existence of human beings,thus establishing the universal moral norms,but it makes freedom stay in the kingdom of reason and morality and become an abstract "ought".According to Hegel,there are three major problems in Kantian ethics:hypocrisy,formalism and willful evil accompanied by self-confirming conscience.Hegel sublated externality through the ideality of spirit and demonstrated that man can obtain the real freedom in his own role existence,thus making the realization of freedom in the empirical world possible.Furthermore,he guaranteed the implementation of ethical norms through the legal system established by the ethical community.

关 键 词：本相的自由 实相的自由 法哲学 角色性存在 

分 类 号：B1[哲学宗教—世界哲学]