规范法理学及其先验论证错误——对德沃金《法律帝国》的批判性阅读  

On Dworkin’s Normative Jurisprudence and the Transcendental Argument Problem

作　　者：张琳 Zhang Lin

机构地区：[1]复旦大学法学院

出　　处：《理论界》2022年第1期52-58,共7页Theory Horizon

摘　　要：关于法律与道德的关系这一经典问题,德沃金提出介于法实证主义和传统自然法理论之间的中间形态的规范法理学,他在《法律帝国》一书中提出法律系统整体有着"整全性",且不具有形而上学的特征,但能够保证关于所有案件的判断都有唯一正确的方式,从而德沃金似乎在经验性的"规则"和先验性的"金律"之间找寻到了某种中间地带的由"整全性"保证的"原则"。本文试图指出,根本不存在这样的中间地带,德沃金的整全性概念是他的一个不可靠的先验预设,他的规范法理学中因此存在着先验论证错误。In answering the classic problem of what the relationship between law and morality is,Dworkin,proposed a version of normative jurisprudence in his Law’s Empire.Its essential notion of "integrity" works as the feature of the legal system as a whole which does not make any metaphysical commitment to the status of integrity as the traditional natural law theory supporters do.However,it can be employed to ensure one single right answer to each legal case that the legal positivist fails to guarantee.Thus,Dworkin seems to have made a notion which he calls "principle" somewhere between empirical contingent "rules" and the transcendental "golden rules".This article attempts to argue that there is no such middle place at all.Dworkin’s concept of integrity is a priori,thus it is an invalid notion.Therefore,his normative jurisprudence is trapped with a Transcendental Argument Problem at least.

关 键 词：德沃金 规范法理学 整全性 法律与道德 

分 类 号：D9[政治法律—法学]