被动投资者消极参与公司治理的法律规制  

The Legal Regulation of Passive Investors’ Participation in Corporate Governance

作　　者：缪若冰 Miao Ruobing

机构地区：[1]重庆大学法学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2022年第2期36-43,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：司法部2019年度国家法治与法学理论研究项目“中国公司法制度建构的影响要素分析”(批准号:19SFB3038);中央高校基本科研业务费NO.2020CDSKXYFX009资助项目。

摘　　要：本文探讨了被动投资者消极参与公司治理问题及法律规制路径。研究发现,我国现行法律规范未区分主动投资者与被动投资者,统一适用信义义务、信息披露等规定来予以约束,难以有效调动被动投资者参与公司治理的积极性。随着被动投资者规模的不断扩大,如其参与公司治理的激励问题无法有效解决,必将持续弱化市场纪律的作用。建议考虑通过限制被动投资者投票权、对非常规事项进行穿透式表决等方式强化对被动投资者的激励与约束效果,促使其积极参与公司治理。This paper explores the passive participation of passive investors in corporate governance and the path of legal regulation. This study finds that the existing main legal norms do not distinguish active investors from passive investors, but use unified fiduciary obligations, information disclosure and other provisions to restrict passive investors, which is difficult to effectively motivate their participation in corporate governance. With the continuous expansion of the scale of passive investors,if the problem of participating in corporate governance is not effectively solved, it will continuously weaken the role of market discipline. At the theoretical level, there are suggestions such as limiting the voting rights of passive investors and penetrating voting on unconventional matters, in order to strengthen passive investors’ active participation in corporate governance.

关 键 词：机构投资者 被动投资 公司治理 投资者表决权 指数基金 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学]