基于利他偏好的绿色供应链动态均衡分析  

Dynamic equilibrium analysis of green supply chainbased on altruistic preferences

作　　者：李娜[1] 马德青 胡劲松[1] Li Na;Ma Deqing;Hu Jinsong(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2021年第6期798-816,共19页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771129).

摘　　要：构建了绿色供应链微分博弈模型,探讨了成员利他偏好对企业产品绿色度以及经济效益的影响.首先在Stackelberg博弈过程中,运用贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论得到系统均衡解,其次分析并比较了集中、分散以及利他等三种决策模式下的均衡策略,进一步剖析了各成员利他偏好对双方决策和系统利润的影响.研究表明,成员的利他偏好有利于分散决策模式下的供应链绩效获得帕累托改进,是一种亲社会性偏好;供应商利他偏好在供应链中起着积极的主导作用,并且其利他程度影响着制造商利他偏好对供应链绩效的作用效果;在保证供应商高度且合理利他的同时将制造商利他系数控制在较低水平能使绿色供应链总利润以及产品绿色度得到最大程度的提高,这一发现有利于企业找到合适的合作伙伴,形成一个良性供应链.This paper establishes a differential game model of green supply chains,and analyzes the impact of altruistic preferences on both the greenness and profit of enterprises.Firstly,the equilibrium solutions of Stackelberg game are derived from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.Then,the optimal strategies are addressed under the three different decision models of centralized decision,decentralized decision and altruistic decision.Further,the impact of altruistic preference on both optial decisions and system profit are analyzed.The results show that the altruistic preference can be profit-Pareto-improving on green supply chain.Additionally,the supplier’s altruistic preference plays a positive leading role in supply chain,and the effect of the manufacturer’s altruistic preference on the supply chain is related to the degree of altruistic preference of supplier.Through analysis,the manufacturer should adopt a lower altruistic preference coefficient while ensuring that the supplier’s altruistic preference coefficient is high,which can maximize the total profit of the green supply chain and the greenness of the product.

关 键 词：利他偏好 绿色供应链 动态均衡 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]