基于SD模型的绿色技术创新影响机理——以企业与政府演化博弈为视角  

Impact Mechanism of Green Technology Innovation Based on SD Model——From the Perspective of the Evolutionary Game Theory between Enterprise and Government

作　　者：佟岩[1] 蒋雪娇 TONG Yan;JIANG Xuejiao(College of Economics, Shenyang University, Shenyang 110041, China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳110041

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期25-33,共9页Journal of Shenyang University:Social Science

摘　　要：构建了政府与企业演化博弈模型,从系统动力学视角利用Vensim软件改变模型中的3个力度系数,仿真出双方博弈的演化状态,进而分析双方进行策略选择的动态变化及影响因素。研究表明:政府加大税收优惠力度、发放创新补贴可以有效激励企业向绿色技术创新方向演化,但随着发展,对企业的激励效应减弱;政府采取适度的惩罚措施会正向引导企业作出绿色技术创新行为,而高强度的惩罚则会极大地削弱企业绿色技术创新的主动性;长期、适中的技术改进可以有效促进企业绿色技术创新,不合理的技术改进往往会对企业绿色技术创新发展产生不利影响。This article constructs an evolutionary game theory model between the enterprise and the government.It uses the system dynamics Vensim software to change the three dynamics coefficients in the model,and simulates the evolutionary state of the game between the two sides,and then analyzes the dynamic changes and influencing factors of each side's strategic choices.The research shows that increasing tax incentives and granting innovation subsidies can effectively encourage enterprises to evolve towards green technological innovation,but with the development,the incentive effect on enterprises is weakened;moderate punishment measures taken by the government will positively guide enterprises to conduct green technological innovation behavior,while high-intensity punishment will greatly weaken their initiative;long-term and moderate technological improvement can effectively promote enterprise green technological innovation,while unreasonable ones often have adverse impacts.

关 键 词：SD模型 绿色技术创新 企业 政府 环境规制 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学] F224.68