机场安全运行监管机制的动态博弈分析  被引量:1

Dynamic Game Analysis of Airport Security Operation Supervision Mechanism

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作  者:文军[1] 孙静 WEN Jun;SUN Jing(Airport Engineering and Transportation Management College,Civil Aviation Flight University of China,Guanghan 618307,China)

机构地区:[1]中国民航飞行学院机场工程与运输管理学院,四川广汉618307

出  处:《数学的实践与认识》2022年第1期1-8,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基  金:民航软科学科研基金(MHRD201024);2017年度学院科研基金学生科技活动资金项目(X2017-36);2017年大学生创新创业项目(201710624047)。

摘  要:监管机制是否行之有效是决定机场能否长期安全运行的关键所在.针对机场安全运行监管现状,进一步挖掘机场与政府之间内在博弈机理,在引入机场按章运行与违章运行下发生不安全事件概率因子的基础上,构建了机场与政府之间的安全运行动态监管博弈模型,研究了二者在机场安全运行监管过程中博弈双方的策略选择问题.通过对模型混合策略纳什均衡进行求解,分别讨论了政府与机场策略选择影响因素.结果表明:政府的监管能力和机场违章运行发生不安全事件的概率对博弈均衡影响显著.通过对机场收益和成本构成进一步分析,揭示了机场可能违章运行动机,指出了政府应严格监管机场非航性收益和运行成本.并在此基础上给出了相关政策建议,以期为监管部门完善机场安全运行监管体系提供理论依据.Whether the supervision mechanism is effective or not is the key to the longterm security operation of the airport.In view of the current situation of airport security operation supervision,the probabilities of unsafe events under legal and illegal operation were introduced respectively based on the analysis of internal game mechanism between government and airport.And then,the strategic choices of the two players in the process of airport security operation supervision were studied through building a dynamic supervision game model of government and airport.By solving the Nash equilibrium of the mixed strategy of the model,the factors of government and airport strategy selection were discussed respectively.The result indicates that the government’s regulatory capacity and the probability of unsafe event under illegal operation have a significant impact on game equilibrium.Though further analysis of the airport’s revenue and cost,the motives of the airport’s possible violation were revealed.It proves that government strictly reviews the airport’s non-airborne benefits and operational costs.And relevant policy recommendations have been given,in order to provide a theoretical basis for the regulatory authorities to improve the airport security operation supervision system.

关 键 词:监管机制 动态博弈 机场安全运行监管 策略选择 纳什均衡 

分 类 号:F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] D630[政治法律—政治学] F562[政治法律—中外政治制度]

 

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