社会责任投资基金的实施契约与代理成本的关系研究  

Research on the Relationship Between Implementation Contracts and Agency Costs of Socially Responsi-ble Investment Funds

作　　者：危平[1] 薛晨晖 舒浩 Wei Ping

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]中国民生银行北京分行,北京100101

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2022年第2期10-19,共10页Financial Theory and Practice

基　　金：湖南省社会科学基金一般项目“绿色金融背景下我国机构投资者短期环境套利行为的识别与评价研究”(18YBA432);中南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助“碳风险对企业资本结构及其动态性的影响研究”(2021zzts0025)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：通过对社会责任投资基金契约条款适应社会责任目标而进行的规范和调整进行评估,并采用异质性随机前沿分析和LSDV法阐释基于契约的社会责任约束程度与基金代理成本之间的关系,研究发现,非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金的契约对社会责任主题的约束程度普遍高于市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金,这种差异主要体现在投资目标和投资范围的契约条款设计方面。社会责任投资基金的契约得分与基金的代理成本呈正相关关系,尤其是非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金表现得更加明显。因此,“规则前置”的契约条款对社会责任主题的限制和约束增加了代理成本,契约作为一种硬约束手段在解决委托代理问题上作用有限。This paper focuses on contract design and agency cost evaluation in socially responsible investment funds,in order to explore how contract practices adapt to the added objectives and its per-formance.The paper evaluates the adaptation of fund contract practices around“social responsibili-ty”at five dimensions,and then uses heterogeneous stochastic frontier analysis method and the LSDV method to evaluate the level of agency cost of the fund contract design,and to interpret the relation-ship between the adaptation level and fund agency cost.The result shows that:in China context,con-tracts in non-market-rate seeking(NMRS)funds have more social objective related confined clauses than market-rate seeking(MRS)funds.Contract scores of sample social funds have positive correla-tions with fund agency cost.This effect is particularly significant for NMRS funds.This indicates that the adding of the social objective related confined clausesin the fund contracts increases the costs of governance.

关 键 词：社会责任投资 投资基金 契约 委托代理问题 代理成本 异质性前沿分析 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]