Stackelberg竞争下考虑消费者转移和平台差异的供应商运营策略  

Supplier Operation Strategy Considering Consumer Transfer and Platform Difference under Stackelberg Competition

作　　者：李春雨[1] 张翠华[1] 李艳婷 LI Chunyu;ZHANG Cuihua;LI Yanting(Northeastern University,Shenyang,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2022年第1期102-111,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771044);辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L20BJY006)。

摘　　要：考虑消费者转移和平台差异对需求的影响,构建不同渠道结构和销售契约下的决策模型;基于水平和垂直Stackelberg博弈,获得8种情形下的最优决策。探究佣金率、平台差异和消费者转移率对均衡结果的影响,获得最优的销售契约和渠道配置策略。研究表明:代理模式可以降低产品的销售价格,提升销量;垄断市场中,平台更愿意采取转售模式,而供应商更偏好代理模式;竞争环境下,优势平台一定条件下总是更偏好转售模式,而竞争平台销售模式偏好随着佣金率逐渐变化;供应商的渠道选择与消费者转移量有关,当转移量较高时,供应商偏向双渠道结构,反之亦然。Considering the impact of consumer transfer and platform difference on demand,the decision-making models under different channel structures and sales contracts are constructed.Based on Stackelberg game between the horizontal and vertical channel,the optimal decisions in eight situations are obtained.The impact of commission rates,platform difference and consumer transfer rate on the equilibrium results are explored to obtain the optimal sales contract and channel configuration strategy.The study shows that the agency contract can reduce selling prices and increases sales volumes.In the monopoly market,platforms are more willing to adopt a reselling contract,however,the supplier prefers the agency contract.In the competitive environment,the dominant platform always prefers reselling mode under certain conditions,while the competitive platform’s preferred sales mode changes gradually with the commission rate.The channel selection strategy of the supplier is related to the consumers’transfer volume;when the transfer volume is high,the supplier prefers a dual-channel structure,vice versa.

关 键 词：渠道配置 销售契约 消费者转移 平台差异 STACKELBERG竞争 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]