基于演化博弈分析的国际项目招标模式研究  

Research on International Project Bidding Model Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

作　　者：金峰 向文武 汲铮 Jin Feng;Xiang Wenwu;Ji Zheng(Sinopec Engineering(Group)Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100029,China;School of National Development and Policy,Southeast University,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]中石化炼化工程(集团)股份有限公司,北京100029 [2]东南大学国家发展与政策研究院,北京100083

出　　处：《当代石油石化》2022年第2期39-44,54,共7页Petroleum & Petrochemical Today

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“大数据背景下国际工程项目风险智能预测与防控策略研究”资助(项目编号19BGL005)

摘　　要：新冠疫情下,全球经济受到重创,很多国家的资本项目因为资金难题而暂停或取消。在此背景下,项目东道国政府更倾向于直接投资模式,解决项目融资难题,而中国企业倾向于工程承包(EPC)模式,降低经营风险,这种分歧造成了双方博弈的出现。文章基于演化博弈模型,推导出EPC模式将是项目东道国和中国企业双方合作趋向的长期稳定平衡模式,并通过@Risk软件数值仿真,重点分析各种参数对策略稳定状态的影响。本研究对中国企业践行“走出去”战略有参考意义,同时对政府招商引资模式构建亦有借鉴价值。The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the global economy hard,and many countries’capital projects have been suspended or canceled due to financial difficulties.In this context,the government of the project host country prefers the direct mode to solve the project financing problems,while the Chinese enterprises prefer the project contracting mode to reduce operational risks.Such differences lead to the emergence of the game between the two sides.Through the analysis of evolutionary game model,this paper deduces the stable balance between the project host country and Chinese enterprises,that is,the final adoption of EPC mode will be a long-term stable mode.The influence of various parameters on the stable state of the strategy was analyzed,and the@risk software was used for numerical simulation.This study has reference significance for Chinese enterprises to practice the“going out”strategy,and also has reference value for the government to construct the mode of attracting investment.

关 键 词：直接投资 工程承包 演化博弈 数值仿真 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F426.92[经济管理—产业经济] F271F125F224.32