独董独立性谜题与机制独立性再造  

The Puzzle of Independence of Independent Director and Reconstruction of the Independence Mechanism

作　　者：汪青松[1] 罗娜 Wang Qingsong;Luo Na

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学民商法学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2022年第3期43-51,共9页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社科基金后期资助项目“数字经济时代的营业性构造演进与商主体体系创新研究”(19FFXB008);重庆市研究生科研创新项目“突发公共卫生事件中董事损害赔偿责任的偏失与重构”(CYB20121)。

摘　　要：缘起于美国的独立董事制度借助英国公司治理准则的"遵守或解释"法技术设计兴起,作为改善上市公司治理质量的有效机制已成全球共识。然而,"郑百文案""康美药业案"等凸显了中国现有独董制度的内在缺陷与功能不彰。独立董事"不独立"的追问并未触及独立董事因何独立之本质。独立董事独立性的域外考察表明,应面向上市公司治理机制中的特殊制度需求,对独董独立性的内涵进行本土化改造,中国上市公司独董制度应实现从身份性独立到功能性独立的理念转变,使之成为代表中小股东利益的独立监督机制。为此,应从独董任免、行权、薪酬、责任与救济等具体机制方面实现独董功能性独立之再造。The independent director system originated from the United States being an effective mechanism to improve the governance quality of listed companies, has become a global consensus with the help of “compliance or interpretation” of British corporate governance standards. However, the case of Zheng Bai Wen, Kang Mei Pharmaceutical highlights the serious defects and malfunctions of Chinese existing independent director system. The questioning of independent directors’ “non-independence” does not touch upon the essence of independent directors’ independence. The extraterritorial investigation of the independence of independent directors shows that China shall localize the connotation of the independence of independent directors for the special institutional needs of the governance mechanism of listed companies. Therefore, Chinese independent board shall realize the transformation from identity independence to functional independence, so that the independent board system becomes an independent supervision mechanism representing the interests of minority shareholders. In order to fulfil the aforementioned goals, China shall realize the reconstruction of functional independence of independent directors from the specific mechanisms of appointment and removal, exercise of power, compensation, responsibility and relief.

关 键 词：独立董事 功能性独立 监督机制 公司治理 中小股东利益保护 

分 类 号：DF438.7[政治法律—经济法学]