基于博弈分析的废旧铅酸蓄电池双回收渠道补贴与监管研究  

Subsidies and Supervision of Dual Recycling Channels for Used Lead-acid Batteries Based on Game Analysis

作　　者：徐文君 狄卫民[2] XU Wenjun;DI Weimin(School of Business Administration,Henan Finance University,Zhengzhou 451464,China;School of Management Engineering,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]河南财政金融学院工商管理学院,河南郑州451464 [2]郑州大学管理工程学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《物流科技》2022年第3期50-55,共6页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：河南省高等学校重点科研项目计划资助项目(20A630034)。

摘　　要：为规范铅酸蓄电池回收市场,分别建立了政府基于铅回收率补贴正规回收渠道和监管非正规回收渠道两个博弈模型,分析了政府单位补贴额度和单位监管力度对两渠道回收价格、回收量和利润的影响,比较了两种政府治理措施的优劣。研究结果表明:两种措施均可以有效规范铅酸蓄电池回收市场,但补贴措施能产生更大的经济效益,而两种措施的环境效益优劣受回收量对回收价格的敏感系数、渠道间的竞争系数、单位补贴额度、监管努力程度以及正规回收渠道铅回收率等因素的综合影响。In order to standardize the lead-acid battery recycling market, two game models were established, namely, government subsidized the formal recycling channels based on the lead recycling rate and regulated informal recycling channels.This paper analyzed the impact of government subsidies and supervision on the recovery price, recovery volume and profit of the two channels, and compared the pros and cons of the two governance measures. The research results show that the two governance measures can effectively regulate the lead-acid battery recycling market, and subsidy measures can produce greater economic benefits. The environmental benefits of the two governance measures are affected by the comprehensive influence of factors, such as the sensitivity coefficient of the recycling volume to the recycling price, the coefficient of competition between the recycling channels, unit subsidy amount,the degree of supervision efforts, and the lead recovery rate of formal recycling channels.

关 键 词：废旧铅酸蓄电池 双回收渠道 博弈分析 政府补贴与监管 

分 类 号：F252.19[经济管理—国民经济]