考虑参考质量效应的双渠道供应链定价策略与协调机制  

Pricing Strategy and Coordination Mechanism of Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Quality Effect

作　　者：李秀莲 颜李朝[1] LI Xiulian;YAN Lizhao(College of Business, Hunan Normal University, Changsha 410081, China)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《广东石油化工学院学报》2022年第1期74-78,共5页Journal of Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology

基　　金：湖南省社会科学规划基金(20YBA175)。

摘　　要：消费者在购物后体验到的产品实际质量和购物前预期的产品参考质量的差异通常会影响产品的市场需求和品牌的商誉。通过考虑消费者参考质量效应的影响,研究由一个制造商、一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链在集中式决策、分散式决策Bertrand博弈、分散式决策Stackelberg博弈下的定价问题,并构建基于参考质量效应下的成本分担契约来探讨双渠道供应链的协调性。结果表明:消费者的参考质量效应对双渠道供应链的均衡价格以及利润产生正向影响,在正常情况下双渠道供应链无法实现协调,成本分担契约能在一定程度上降低双渠道供应链的双重边际效应,提高双渠道供应链的利润。The difference between the actual product quality experienced by consumers after shopping and the product reference quality expected before shopping usually has a significant effect on product demand and brand reputation.We consider a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer.We investigate the influence of consumers'reference quality under centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making Bertrand game,and decentralized decision-making Stackelberg game.Furthermore,in view of the influence of reference quality,we construct cost-sharing contracts to discuss the consistency of the dual-channel supply chain.The results show that consumers'reference quality effect has a positive impact on the equilibrium price and profit of the dual-channel supply chain.Under normal circumstances,the dual-channel supply chain cannot achieve conformity.However,the cost-sharing contracts can reduce the dual marginal effect of the dual-channel supply chain to a certain extent,and increase the profit of the dual-channel supply chain.Finally,we perform simulation verification with numerical values.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 参考质量效应 BERTRAND博弈 STACKELBERG博弈 成本分担契约 

分 类 号：F326[经济管理—产业经济]