基于三方相互体谅讨价还价的IPD团队风险分担  

IPD Team Risk Sharing Based on Tripartite Mutual Considerate Bargaining Model

作　　者：臧雅萱 周直 ZANG Ya-xuan;ZHOU Zhi(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2022年第1期123-128,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

摘　　要：针对IPD模式下公路工程建设项目中需三方共同承担的风险分担问题,选择全过程咨询方作为除业主和施工方以外的第三方,构建基于适应性预期的三方相互体谅讨价还价模型。各方在初始策略下,体谅另外两方的诉求,根据适应性预期调整己方下一轮策略,经过多轮谈判达到均衡,求得各方需承担风险的合理比例。该博弈属于不完全信息下的无限重复合作博弈,应用到工程实际时,三方在博弈轮次达到一定数量或策略调整幅度较小时可及时停止谈判。并以算例验证了三方相互体谅讨价还价模型的可靠性及分担比例的合理性。Aiming at the problem of risk sharing that needs to be shared by the three parties in highway construction projects under the IPD model,the whole process consultant is selected as the third party in addition to the owner and the constructor.Then,a tripartite mutual considerate bargaining model is constructed based on adaptive expectations.Under the initial strategy,each party is considerate of the demands from the other two parties,and adjusts its strategies for the next round according to adaptive expectations.After several rounds of negotiation,an equilibrium is reached and a reasonable proportion of risks to be assumed by all parties is obtained.This game belongs to infinite repeated cooperative game with incomplete information.when applied to engineering practice,the three parties can stop the negotiation in time when the game round reaches a certain number or the strategy adjustment range is small.Finally,an example is used to verify the reliability of the tripartite mutual considerate bargaining model and the rationality of the share ratio.

关 键 词：IPD 全过程咨询 风险分担 讨价还价 适应性预期 

分 类 号：TU71[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]