合作研发策略选择问题的动态演化分析  

Dynamic Evolution Analysis of Cooperative R&D Strategy Selection

作　　者：刘敬伟 黄成节[2] 蒲勇健[2] LIU Jing-wei;HUANG Cheng-jie;PU Yong-jian(Moutai Institute,Renhuai Guizhou 564500,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400040,China)

机构地区：[1]茅台学院工商管理系,贵州仁怀564500 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400040

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2022年第2期15-19,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(19BJL081)。

摘　　要：合作研发是国家创新战略的核心内容之一,在合作研发的合作模式上,双方能否建立良好的合作机制是合作研发成败的关键。在有限理性和不完全信息的前提下,以演化稳定策略和复制动态方程为建模基础,构建合作研发策略选择问题的演化博弈模型,分析合作双方决策行为的动态演化过程,并对模型结果进行数值模拟与仿真分析,为合作研发决策提供参考。研究表明:为促使合作双方的策略选择趋于最优稳定策略,须加大对合作研发中机会主义行为的惩罚力度,降低机会主义行为所产生的收益,同时,双方应努力降低研发成本,提高合作收益。Cooperative R&D is one of the core contents of national innovation strategy.In the cooperation mode of cooperative R&D,whether the two sides can establish a good cooperation mechanism is the key to the success or failure of cooperative R&D.Under the premise of limited rationality and incomplete information,based on the evolutionary stable strategy and replication dynamic equation,the evolutionary game model of cooperative R&D strategy selection is constructed,and the dynamic evolution process of decision-making behavior of both partners is analyzed,and the results of the model are simulated and analyzed to provide reference for cooperative R&D decision-making.The results show that:in order to make the strategy choice of both sides tend to be optimal and stable,it is necessary to increase the punishment of opportunistic behavior in cooperative R&D and reduce the benefits of opportunistic behavior.At the same time,both sides should strive to reduce the R&D costs and increase the cooperation benefits.

关 键 词：合作研发 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 复制动态 

分 类 号：F124.3[经济管理—世界经济]