人工智能是面相盲人吗?——从维特根斯坦的知觉哲学看  

Is Artificial Intelligencean Aspect-blind?Based on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Perception

作　　者：李国山[1] 袁菜琼 LI Guoshan;YUAN Caiqiong(College of Philosophy, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China;School of Marxism, Hainan University, Haikou 570228, China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院,天津300350 [2]海南大学马克思主义学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第2期1-6,61,共7页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(21AZX012)。

摘　　要：在面相知觉的论题下,维特根斯坦借助“面相盲人”形象来回应身心关系、他心及机器能否思维等问题。可以说,符号人工智能是面相盲人的典型形象,因为它只能按形式化的规则来操作符号,缺乏内在生命和情感体验。根据维特根斯坦的知觉哲学,作为面相盲人的人工智能在社会互动层面存在根本困难,不能真正参与到语言游戏中,无法享有人类的生活方式。不过,人工智能究竟能在多大程度上接近人类智能,依然是个开放的问题。Under the theme of aspect-perception,Wittgenstein uses the image of“aspect-blind”to respond to the issues of mind-body relations,other minds and whether artificial intelligence could think like human beings.It can be said that symbolic artificial intelligence is a typical image of the aspect-blind,it can only operate symbols according to formal rules,and lacks inner life and emotional experience.According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of perception,artificial intelligence,as an aspect-blind,faces fundamental difficulties in social interaction,cannot truly participate in language games,and can't share human beings'form of life.However,it remains an open question to what degree artificial intelligence could come closer to human intelligence.

关 键 词：面相知觉 面相盲人 人工智能 生活形式 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]