税收分权、资源错配与全要素生产率  

Tax Decentralization,Misallocation of Resource and Total Factor Productivity

作　　者：李齐云[1] 周雪[1] LI Qiyun;ZHOU Xue(School of Economics,Shandong University,Jinan,Shandong,250100)

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第2期112-123,共12页Journal of Anhui University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“中央与地方财政支出责任研究”(19BJY230);山东大学人文社会科学重大研究项目(19RWZD09);山东省自科基金项目(ZR2020QG046)。

摘　　要：对税收分权、资源错配与全要素生产率的关系进行理论梳理和实证检验,将税收分权分为增值税分成和企业所得税分成检验不同税种影响的差异。结果表明:随着官员考核压力的增大,税收分权会通过加剧对资本和劳动力等资源的错配,抑制技术进步,阻碍全要素生产率的提高,且资本错配这条路径的中介效应和受到的调节效应更加显著。受官员考核压力的调节,增值税分成和企业所得税分成均会加剧对资本和劳动力的错配,导致全要素生产率降低。相比较而言,企业所得税分成对全要素生产率的负向影响更大,增值税分成受官员考核压力的调节作用更大。This paper analyzes the theoretical origin of and conducts empirical tests on the relationship between tax decentralization,resource mismatch and total factor productivity.At the same time,the impacts of different taxes are also tested,by subdividing tax decentralization into value-added tax sharing and enterprise income tax sharing.The results show that with increasing demand in assessment of officials,tax decentralization will inhibit technological progress and hinder the improvement of total factor productivity by aggravating the mismatch of resources such as capital and labor.Moreover,the intermediary and regulatory effects of capital mismatch are more significant.Regulated by the demand in assessment of officials,the share of value-added tax and enterprise income tax will exacerbate the mismatch between capital and labor,resulting in the reduction of total factor productivity.In comparison,the enterprise income tax share has a greater negative impact on total factor productivity,and the value-added tax share is more regulated by the demand in assessment of officials.

关 键 词：税收分权 全要素生产率 资源错配 官员考核压力 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]