基于博弈视角的矿工不安全行为管理研究  

Management of Miners′Unsafe Behavior Based on Game Theory

作　　者：李琰[1] 陈侠君 LI Yan;CHEN Xiajun(School of Management,Xi'an University of Science and Technology,Xi'an 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安科技大学管理学院,西安710054

出　　处：《煤炭技术》2022年第3期231-234,共4页Coal Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助(51604216;51874237);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2020R010);西安市社会科学规划基金项目(GL14);教育部人文社科项目(Z1YJA630050);西安科技大学项目(2018SZ04)。

摘　　要：班组长违章指挥是造成一切较大及以上事故的根源,具备不可抗拒性、长期性和潜伏性。因此,为了减少煤矿开采中的不安全行为事故,提高不安全行为管理效率,基于价值感知理论,将矿工不安全行为按照班组长的违章指挥和班组成员的违章作业行为分别构建博弈模型。研究表明:产能提成是造成班组长违规指挥的主要原因;干预收益和监管收益是改变传统型矿工和安全员决策的首要条件。The illegal command of cadres is the root cause of all major and above accidents,which is irresistible,long-term and latent.Therefore,in order to reduce the accidents of unsafe behavior in coal mining and improve the efficiency of unsafe behavior management,based on the value perception theory,the game model of miners′unsafe behavior is constructed according to the illegal command of team leader and the illegal operation of team members.This study shows that productivity commission is the main reason for team leaders′illegal command.The benefits of intervention and supervision are the primary conditions to change the decision-making of traditional miners and safety officers.

关 键 词：矿工 违规指挥 违章作业 博弈模型 

分 类 号：TD79[矿业工程—矿井通风与安全]