官员上任初期的税收策略研究——基于DID的新证据  

Research on Officials’ Tax Strategies at the Beginning of Their Tenure:New Evidence Based on DID

作　　者：赵纯祥[1] 叶慧芬 杨怏 ZHAO Chunxiang;YE Huifen;YANG Yang(School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China;School of Accounting,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财经论丛》2022年第4期25-35,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(20BGL084);湖北省技术创新专项软科学研究项目(2018ADC 027);中南财经政法大学基本科研业务费项目(2722020PY021)。

摘　　要：主流文献中关于地方政府税收竞争类型的观点存在分歧。本文基于我国A股上市公司2009—2018年数据,运用双重差分模型考察企业税负跨期纵向变化,对官员上任初期税收策略类型进行检验,发现官员上任后展开了税收逐底竞争。在排除前任官员收取过头税的竞争性假设和控制内生性问题后,本文的结论依然成立。进一步分析发现,我国设立税种和制定税率的权力集中在中央政府,地方官员难以降低法定税率,只能通过降低税收征管力度来实施税收逐底竞争。此外,地方官员税收竞争的主要对象是高流动性行业的资本,晋升竞争越激烈的省份,官员实施税收逐底竞争的积极性越高。There exist two opposite viewpoints about local governments’ tax competition in prior research.Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018,this paper conducts a DID test to examine the corporate tax burden changes between different periods and analyze officials’ tax strategies at the beginning of their tenure.A significant decrease has been found in the effective tax rate of the enterprises located in the successive officials’ jurisdictions.It indicates that they initiate the tax race to bottom.This conclusion remains valid after excluding the competing hypothesis that excessive tax is collected by former officials.Further analysis finds that local officials fall back on the relaxation of tax enforcement to win the tax race against officials in other regions because the power to set taxes and their rates is held by the central government.The main goal of the tax race to bottom is to compete for the capital of the industries with high liquidity.In the provinces with intensified promotion competition,local officials show more enthusiasm for the tax race to the bottom.

关 键 词：继任官员 税收策略 新经济地理学 双重差分 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]