本地经理人更倾向于选择本地事务所吗?——从审计合谋的视角  

Do Local CEOs Prefer Local Auditors?——From the perspective of audit collusion

作　　者：饶育蕾[1] 郭连 彭叠峰[1] Rao Yulei;Guo Lian;Peng Diefeng

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,410083

出　　处：《审计研究》2022年第1期82-93,共12页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71910107001、71673306)的资助。

摘　　要：一些上市公司更倾向于雇佣本地事务所为其提供审计服务,这种现象被称之为会计师事务所选择的"地缘偏好"。本文以2003-2019年沪深上市公司为样本,实证分析了这种"地缘偏好"如何受到经理人与事务所之间潜在地缘关系的影响。研究结果表明,与外地经理人任职的上市公司相比,被本地经理人管理的上市公司更倾向于选择本地事务所提供的审计服务。经济后果检验进一步表明,本地经理人选择本地事务所会支付更高的异常审计费用,获得更多的标准审计意见,同时进行更多的盈余管理。对于代理成本较高、经理人权力更大、独立董事监督较弱、机构投资者持股比例较低以及所在地法治化水平较低的上市公司,本地经理人在事务所选择时所表现的"地缘偏好"在统计上或经济上具有更强的显著性。这些证据基本上支持基于代理理论的审计合谋假设。Many listed companies employ local auditors more frequently than they should do,which is called geographic preference on auditor choice.Using the companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 through 2019 as samples,this paper empirically examines how the geographic preferences are influenced by the potential geographic relationship between CEOs and auditors.The results show that,compared to the companies whose CEOs were born out of the province,the companies managed by local CEOs are more likely to purchase the service provided by local auditors.The tests of economic consequences show that local CEOs pay more abnormal audit fee,get more standard audit opinion,and engage in more earnings management by choosing local auditors.Furthermore,the observed geographic preferences are more pronounced in economic or statistic sense among the companies which have higher agency cost,or were controlled by more powerful CEOs,or have weaker independent director governance,or have lower institution ownership,or were located in regions with lower level of law-based administration.The empirically evidence basically supports the audit collusion based on agency theory.

关 键 词：会计师事务所选择 地缘偏好 审计合谋 代理问题 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]