基于混合策略博弈模型的铁路公益性运输补贴机制分析  

A Study on Subsidy Mechanism of Railway Public-welfare Transport Based on Mixed Strategy Game Model

作　　者：郭利田 王占 李悦 GUO Litian;WANG Zhan;LI Yue(Transportation & Economics Research Institute, China Academy of Railway Sciences Corporation Limited,Beijing 100081, China;Ministry of Materials and Equipment, China State Railway Group. , Ltd. , Beijing 100844, China)

机构地区：[1]中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司运输经济研究所,北京100081 [2]中国国家铁路集团有限公司物资部,北京100844

出　　处：《重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第2期42-51,共10页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：中国国家铁路集团有限公司科技研究开发计划“基于不同市场结构的铁路物资采购价格影响因素影响效率研究”(2021F014);中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司科研项目“国铁控股合资铁路公司经营效益分类提升技术”(2019YJ082)。

摘　　要：铁路公益性运输是深化铁路企业改革发展需要解决的重要问题,然而无论官方文件还是学术研究中,对铁路公益性运输的界定尚未达成一致。为此,从旅客运输、货物运输、铁路线路三个方面界定铁路公益性运输的范围;构建政府与铁路企业监督博弈模型,基于混合策略纳什均衡分析结果,设计我国铁路公益性运输亏损补贴机制;提出研究建立铁路公益性运输补贴机制的设想和建议。Railway public-welfare transport is an important issue which can deepen the reform and development of railway enterprises.However,there is no agreement on the definition of railway public-welfare transport in official documents or in academic research.This paper defines the scope of railway public-welfare transport from three aspects,namely,passenger transport,freight transport and route,then sets up a supervision game of government and railway enterprises,and designs subsidy mechanism of railway public-welfare based on the results of Nash equilibrium analysis of mixed strategy.Finally,this paper puts forward four suggestions on establishing subsidy mechanism.

关 键 词：铁路公益性运输 运营亏损 补贴机制 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F530.5[经济管理—产业经济]