Optimal Equilibrium Selection of Price-maker Agents in Performance-based Regulation Market  

作　　者：Mohammad Rayati Aras Sheikhi Ali Mohammad Ranjbar Wei Sun 

机构地区：[1]Department of Electrical Engineering,Sharif University of Technology,Tehran,Iran [2]Sharif Energy Research Institute(SERI),Sharif University of Technology,Tehran,Iran [3]Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,University of Central Florida,Orlando,FL 32816,USA

出　　处：《Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy》2022年第1期204-212,共9页现代电力系统与清洁能源学报（英文）

摘　　要：This paper analyzes the oligopolistic equilibria of multiple price-maker agents in performance-based regulation(PBR)markets.In these markets,there are price-maker agents representing some frequency regulation(FR)providers and a number of independent price-taker FR providers.A model of equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints(EPECs)is employed in this paper to study the equilibria of a PBR market in the presence of price-maker agents and price-taker FR providers.Due to the incorporation of the FR providers’dynamics,the proposed model is reformulated as a mixed-integer linear programming(MILP)problem over innovative mathematical techniques.An optimal equilibrium point is also selected for the market,where none of the agents is the unique deviator and the dynamic performance of power system is improved simultaneously.The effectiveness of the proposed optimal equilibrium point is evaluated by comparing the outputs with the conventional optimal dispatches of the FR providers.

关 键 词：Performance-based regulation(PBR)market multi-agent system equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraint(EPEC) frequency regulation(FR) mixed-integer linear programming(MILP) 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]