转售价格维持规制中的单方逻辑迷思  

The Logical Myth with Unilateral Status in Resale Price Maintenance Regulation

作　　者：李剑[1] Li Jian

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学凯原法学院

出　　处：《法学》2022年第3期146-162,共17页Law Science

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“中国反垄断法的移植与本土化研究”(项目号:18BFX150);上海市曙光项目“转售价格维持的反垄断法规制研究”(项目号:15SG11)的成果。

摘　　要：转售价格维持是纵向垄断协议的典型形式。但在我国的转售价格维持案件中,执法机构都只处罚了协议的一方,法院也大多认可作为垄断协议主体的经销商是适格原告。从现实性的角度看,这虽然考虑了纵向协议案件中涉及的主体数量庞大、协议为生产商所强加的因素,也与欧盟竞争法的做法类似,但是这种单方行为逻辑和协议所要求的合意行为之间存在着显著冲突。现实中呈现的转售价格维持协议,既可以是纵向协议,也可以同时包含纵向和横向协议的因素,还可能是滥用市场支配地位的结果。多种可能性的存在使得反垄断法在制度构建上需要超越简单的纵向、横向协议二分,通过协议的推定以及创设新类型的滥用行为予以回应。Resale price maintenance is a typical form of vertical monopoly agreement.However,in the cases of RPM in China,the law enforcement agencies only penalize one party,and the court mostly recognizes the standing of the plaintiff.From a practical point of view,it takes into account the large number of subjects involved in vertical agreement cases,and the factor that the agreements are imposed on distributors.The similar practices could also be found in the cases of EU.Despite the practice,significant conflict exists between unilateral conduct and the consensual conduct.In reality,the RPM agreements can be not only vertical agreement,but also mixture of vertical and horizontal agreement.Meanwhile,it may also be the result of abuse of dominant position.The various possibilities make it necessary to go beyond the dichotomy of vertical and horizontal agreements,and to respond through the presumption of agreements.In addition,there is need to create new types of abuse under anti-monopoly law.

关 键 词：纵向垄断协议 转售价格维持 单方行为 合意 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]