“以内治外”——央地博弈下的近代地方财政监督制度设计  

On the Institutional Design of Modern Local Financial Supervision System Under the Background of Central-local Game

作　　者：肖高华[1] Xiao Gaohua

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学马克思主义学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《史学月刊》2022年第1期46-58,共13页Journal of Historical Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“近代中国监督制度资料整理与研究”(18ZDA199)。

摘　　要：中央对地方财政监督是央地关系中的重要环节。在地方财政监督近代转型中,时贤先后就省财政清理中部臣与疆臣的监督权限、"联省自治"下中央对地方财政的监督权、地方自治完成后中央与地方民意机关对地方财政监督权等问题进行了深入探讨,并从财政视察、财务稽核、财政督导、中央补助金等方面提出了诸多地方财政监督制度主张。这些制度设计主张为近代地方财政监督转型提供了一定的思想资源,至今仍有某些参考价值。The supervision of the central government over the local finance is an important link in the relationship between the central government and the local government.In the modern transformation of local financial supervision, man of the hour respectively discussed the scope of supervision authority of the central government over local finance on such issues as the power of supervision over local finance by the central government under the “joint provincial autonomy”,and the power of supervision over local finance by the central government and local public opinion organs after the realization of local autonomy.They also posed many proposes on the local financial supervision system in terms of financial inspection, financial audit, financial supervision, and central subsidies.These proposals of institutional design provided certain intellectual resources for the transformation of modern local financial supervision which still have some reference value up to now.

关 键 词：财政监督 中央与地方 权力博弈 近代中国 

分 类 号：K26[历史地理—历史学]