审计委员会会计专长与分析师盈余预测行为  

Accounting Expertise of Audit Committee and Analyst Earnings Forecast

作　　者：王守海[1] 刘烨炜 徐晓彤[1] 公文 Shouhai Wang;Yewei Liu;Xiaotong Xu;Wen Gong(School of Accountancy,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan Shandong 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2021年第6期58-72,共15页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(19YJA790083);山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2020MG033)。

摘　　要：作为公司治理结构的一项重要制度安排,审计委员会制度受到全球资本市场监管机构与投资者的广泛关注。文章以2008-2018年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验审计委员会会计专长对分析师盈余预测行为的影响。实证结果表明,审计委员会会计专长能够显著降低分析师盈余预测偏差,且主要体现在对分析师乐观性预测的纠偏上。中介效应检验发现,信息披露质量在审计委员会会计专长和分析师盈余预测的关系中发挥部分中介作用。进一步研究表明,不同于狭义会计专长,审计委员会广义会计专长并不能显著降低分析师盈余预测偏差。As an important institutional arrangement in the corporate governance structure,the audit committee institution has received extensive attention from regulators and investors of global capital market.This paper uses A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2018 as research samples to empirically test the impact of the audit committee’s accounting expertise on analyst earnings forecast.The empirical results show that the accounting expertise of the audit committee can significantly reduce bias of analyst earnings forecast,which is mainly reflected in the correction of analyst optimistic forecast.The mediating effect study finds that the quality of information disclosure plays a partial mediating role in the relationship between the audit committee’s accounting expertise and analyst earnings forecast.Further research shows that different from the narrow-sense accounting expertise,the generalized accounting expertise of the audit committee does not significantly reduce analyst earnings forecast deviation.

关 键 词：审计委员会会计专长 分析师盈余预测 信息披露质量 

分 类 号：F239.2[经济管理—会计学]