博弈视角下中国地方政府环境规制竞争——来自省际层面的空间分析证据  

Environmental Regulatory Competition among the Local Governments in China from the Perspective of Game Theory:The Evidence from the Spatial Analysis on the Provincial Level

作　　者：余升国[1] 赵秋银 许可 YU Sheng-guo;ZHAO Qiu-yin;XU Ke(School of Economics,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;Urumqi Central Sub-Branch of People's Bank of China,Urumqi 830002,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济学院,海南海口570228 [2]中国人民银行乌鲁木齐中心支行,新疆乌鲁木齐830002

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2022年第2期148-160,共13页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金：海南省社会科学基金重大委托项目(HNSK(ZD)19-106);国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA110);海南省教育厅高等学校科学研究项目(Hnky2017-14)。

摘　　要：为了分析中国地方政府环境规制竞争行为,基于古诺模型的研究思路提出逐底竞争假说,基于斯塔克伯格模型的思路提出地方政府环境规制竞争的倒“U”假说,并构建空间计量和非线性回归模型进行实证分析。结果表明:东部地方政府间开展同时博弈,其环境规制行为方向相同,属于策略互补型竞争,最终导致“逐底竞争”;东中西部政府行为则存在先后顺序,不同地区间环境规制竞争符合倒“U”假说,即在开始阶段竞争会越来越激烈,当竞争达到一定程度后,先行动政府的“政策刚性”使竞争逐步弱化,竞争策略互动类型兼具互补与替代特征,最终不会导致恶性竞争。基于此,建议增强信息的完全性、完善中央对地方环境规制的总体监管,引导地方政府展开合作博弈竞争;实行环境规制的硬预算约束,引导地方政府适度竞争。In order to analyze the environmental regulatory competition behaviors of local governments in China,the research idea of Cournot model is utilized to propose a hypothesis of"race to bottom"competition,and the idea of Starkberg model for an inverted U hypothesis in the environmental regulatory competition of local governments.Then the model of spatial measurement and the nonlinear regression is built for the empirical analyses.According to the results,the simultaneous game between the local governments in the east shows the same direction in their environmental regulatory behaviors,which belongs to the competition of strategic complement,and ultimately leads to the"race to bottom"competition.However,the behaviors of the eastern,central and western governments display a sequential order.The environmental regulatory competition between different regions is consistent with the inverted U hypothesis.In other words,the competition becomes more and more fierce at the beginning.When the competition reaches a certain level,the"policy rigidity"of the governments taking prior actions will gradually weaken the competition.In this regard,the interaction type of competition strategy shows the complementary and substitutive characteristics,which won’t lead to vicious competition.Therefore,it is suggested to enhance the completeness of information,improve the overall supervision of the central government over the local environmental regulation,guide the local governments to engage in the competition of cooperative game,implement hard budget constraints of environmental regulation,and guide the local governments to participate in moderate competition.

关 键 词：动态博弈 地方政府竞争 环境规制 空间计量模型 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]