财政分权与金融分权的协同性及其对地方政府举债行为的影响研究  

The Influence of the Synergy of Fiscal Decentralization and Financial Decentralization on Local Government Debt Competition Behavior

作　　者：李桂君[1] 田宗博 白彦锋 Li Guijun;Tian Zongbo;Bai Yanfeng

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院 [2]中央财经大学财政税务学院

出　　处：《财政研究》2022年第2期91-105,共15页Public Finance Research

摘　　要：本文以2006—2019年中国地级市统计数据为基础,从财政分权与金融分权的视角分析了地方政府的举债行为。首先对各地级市的财政分权与金融分权是否协同进行了识别,在此基础上,进一步考察了财政分权与金融分权的协同性对地方政府举债行为的影响。研究发现,协同城市的财政杠杆和举债竞争反应系数均显著高于非协同城市,说明财政分权与金融分权协同不仅促进了地方政府的举债行为,还加大了地方政府间的举债竞争。进一步的检验结果表明,财政分权与金融分权协同在不同经济发展水平和不同债务管理时期对地方政府举债的影响具有差异性。研究结论为完善财政分权制度,协调财政金融关系,防范与化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。Based on the perspective of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization,this paper analyzes the debt financing behavior of local governments.Employing the statistical data of China’s prefecture-level cities from 2006 to 2019,this paper identifies synergy of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization at prefecture-level,then investigates the impact on local government debt financing behavior.The results show that the response coefficients of financial leverage and debt competition in synergistic cities are significantly higher than those in non-synergistic cities,indicating that the synergy of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization not only promotes the debt financial behavior of local governments but also strengthens the debt competition among local governments.Further test results show that the synergistic effect of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization on local government debt is different at different levels of economic development and different periods of debt management.The research conclusions provide policy implications for regulating the decentralization system,coordinating fiscal and financial relations,and preventing and resolving local government debt risks.

关 键 词：财政分权 金融分权 地方政府债务 两区制空间杜宾模型 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]