博弈论思想下的主播激励策略数学模型研究  

Study on Mathematical Model of Anchor Incentive Strategy Under the Idea of Game Theory

作　　者：张佳欣 陆媛媛[1] ZHANG Jia-xin;LU Yuan-yuan(College of Mathematics,Jilin Normal University,Changchun 130000,China;College of Mathematics,Jilin Normal University,Siping 136000,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学数学学院,吉林长春130000

出　　处：《通化师范学院学报》2022年第4期69-74,共6页Journal of Tonghua Normal University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71501082)。

摘　　要：数学的应用已深入到自然科学、技术科学、人文社会科学和社会生活的各个方面.该文利用博弈论思想,综合运用stackelberg模型、霍特林(Hotelling)模型和数学分析相关理论,研究当前快速发展的直播行业中,在直播平台监管水平和网络外部性影响下,直播平台和签约主播的最大期望利润,参考网络外部性因素构建消费者效应函数,并根据直播平台监管水平建立博弈模型,求得直播平台的最优监管力度,以及主播的最优努力水平,分析网络外部性所产生的影响,以及平台激励策略.The application of mathematics has penetrated into all aspects of natural science,technical science,social humanities and social life.This article mainly is to use the game theory thought,the integrated use of stackelberg model,Hotelling model and mathematical analysis related theory,study the maximum expected profits of live broadcasting platforms and contracted anchors under the influence of the supervision level of live broadcasting platforms and network externalities in the current rapidly developing live broadcasting industry.Considering the network externalities factors to build consumer effect function,and according to the regulation of live platform level set up game model,the optimal regulation of live platform is obtained,and the impact of network externalities,platform incentive strategy are analyzed.

关 键 词：博弈论 网络直播 主播激励策略 数学模型 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]